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OVERVIEW OF CASE
This is an action to recover money alleged to be owed
Respondent for his feed and feeding of Appellant's cattle.
The parties agreed to compensate Respondent so much money per
1

pound increase or gain on Appellant's cattle.

The weight of

the cattle on delivery being a key issue.
Appellant contends that he was never served a Summons
and Complaint according to the rules of civil procedure and,
therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a
default judgment.

Appellant also contends that he was mislead

by representations made to him by Respondent's attorney and
that Appellant understood that no legal action would be filed
i.e., a default judgment, until weigh tickets were obtained;
that the parties would settle it out of court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant appeals to this court from an Order denying
Appellant's Motion to Vacate or Set Aside a Default Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's Order overturned
and the default judgment set aside on the grounds that:

(1) the

lower court never obtained jurisdiction over the Appellant and
(2)

Appellant's inadvertance in not filing an Answer was

because he was mislead by Respondent's attorney's representations that he would not be defaulted.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 7th day of November, 1978, a deputy
sheriff from Davis County Sheriff's Office went to the home
of Appellant, Douglas K. Freeland, at 445 East 450 North,
Layton, Utah, to serve Appellant a Summons and Complaint in
an action that had been filed in Millard County District
Court by Respondent.

A friend of the Appellant, Edward

Oberg, who happened to be at Appellant's home when the sheriff
came, answered the door.

The deputy sheriff inquired of Mr.

Oberg whether or not he was Appellant.

Mr. Oberg informed

the- process server that he was not the party he sought and
suggested that the officer return later.

The deputy asked Mr.

Oberg whether he lived at the home of the Appellant, to which
he responded that he did not live there, but was a friend of
the Appellant.

The deputy gave Mr. Oberg the papers and

asked him to give them to the Appellant.
The next day, when Appellant returned from a business
trip, in Idaho, Appellant found some papers stuck in his
screen door.

Within a day or two thereafter, Appellant called

Respondent's attorney, Eldon A. Eliason, since his name
appeared on the Complaint.
Appellant and Respondent's attorney discussed the allegations set forth in the Complaint.

Respondent's attorney

informed Appellant that he had been in the cattle business
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for a number of years and that Respondent's Complaints were
not strong ones; that the weight gain on the cattle was not
what one would expect, and that the dollar amount his client,
the Respondent, would be en~itled to, if any, could be best
determined by obtaining certain weight tickets which would
show the weight of the cattle at the time Respondent took
possession of them.
Appellant informed Respondent's attorney that if Respondent did not have the weight tickets in his possession he
would obtain them himself from the trucker who trucked the
cattle for Appellant.
Appellant understood from the telephone conversation
that Respondent's attorney agreed not to pursue any further
legal action until the weight tickets could be obtained by
Appellant.

It was further agreed that the parties were to

have gotten together to settle this issue since with the
weight tickets, the weight of the cattle delivered to Respondent would be known with a certainty and if there was any
amount of money due and owing Respondent, Appellant agreed he
would pay it.

It was Appellant's understanding from the

telephone conversation with Respondent's attorney that no
further legal action would be taken against him until the
weight tickets could be obtained.

Respondent's attorney did

not tell Appellant to file an Answer or obtain legal

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

counsel at any time during the conversation.
Several weeks later, around the 3rd or 4th week of November, 1978, Appellant contacted the truck driver who
informed him that he had the weight tickets and would mail
them to Appellant..

Appellant waited for approximately a

month and then contacted the trucker several additional times,
with three to four weeks lapsing between contacts and being
informed each time, that_the trucker had the weight tickets
and would send them right away to the Appellant.
Appellant proceeded under the assumption that nothing
further would be done until the weight tickets were obtainedc
No additional contact was made between the parties until
Respondent's attorney filed a default judgment, for Appellant's
failure to file an Answer to Respondent's Complaint, on April
11, 1979.
Appellant contacted Respondent's attorney after receiving
an undated letter informing him that default judgment had
been entered against him on the 11th day of April, 1979, in
the amount of $5,879.46.

Appellant contacted Respondent's

attorney upon receipt of the letter and inquired as to why he
had entered judgment against him, since he had agreed not: to
do anything further.

Respondent's attorney informed him that

his client had pressured him to enter the default.
Appellant contacted Scott W. Holt, Attorney for Appellant,
shortly thereafter and Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate
Judgment upon the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction
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over the Appellant in that he had not been served according
to Rule 4{e) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that
Appellant had been mislead as to what actions he should have
taken by Respondent's attorney's statements and the agreements, that no further action would be taken by Respondent
until Respondent had obtained the weight tickets.
The Motion to Vacate was argued on the 17th day of July,
1979, and briefs were submitted on the issue of jurisdiction.
Appellant's Motion was denied on the 18th day of December,
1979 .·

Wherefore Appellant respectfully appeals to this Court.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

Appellant believes that the sole issues before this Court
are as follows:
1.

Whether or not the lower court obtained jurisdiction

over the Appellant.
2.

Whether the lower court erred in not granting

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment after
Appellant demonstrated that there was reasonable justification and excuse for his failure to file an answer.

Appellant's argument is outlined as follows:
Issue I:

The District Court failed to obtain jurisdic-

tion over. the Appellant in that the Appellant was not served
with a Summons and Complaint in accordance with the procedure as is set forth in Rule 4(e) (1) Utah Rules of Civil
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Procedure.
Point 1:

In order to obtain jurisdiction over

Defendant the service of process must be made upon
a suitable person who is living at Defendant's usual
place of abode.
Point 2:

Strict compliance of the statute is required

when service is made in a manner other than by personal service.
Point 3:

Actual notice is.no cure for defective

service of process where the statute allowing process
has not been complied with.
Point 4:

The burden of proof shifts to the Plaintiff

once the Defendant has established the service of
process to be defective.
Issue II:

The trial court erred in refusing to vacate

a default judgment entered against the Appellant where the
Appellant demonstrated that there was a reasonable justification and excuse for his failure to file an·Answer.
Point 1:

Appellant was mislead into not filing an

Answer to Respondent's Complaint by statements made
to him by Respondent's attorney.
Point 2:

It is an abuse of discretion to refuse to

vacate a default judgment where reasonable justification exists.
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Point 3:

Appellant's motion under Rule 60(b) (1),

·utah Rules 6f Civil

Proc~dure

was timely made.

ARGUMENT

ISSUE I
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER
THE APPELLANT

I~

THAT

TH~

APPELLANT WAS NOT SERVED

WITH A SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
PROCEDURE AS IS SET FORTH IN RULE 4(e) (1) UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

POINT 1: IN ORDER TO OBTAIN JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT THE
SERVICE OF PROCESS MUST BE MADE UPON A SUITABLE PERSON WHO
IS .LIVING AT DEFENDANT'S USUAL PLACE OF ABODE.
Respondent never effected service of process on the
Appellant in this matter since Appellant was never served
in accordance to Rule 4 (e) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule

(e) (1) requires that the Defendant either be

served personally or that some person who is residing at
Defendant's usual place of abode be served in order for jurisdiction to be obtained over the Defendant. Rule (e) (1) is
as follows:
Personal service within the state shall be as follows:
(1)
Upon a natural person of the age of
14 years or over, by delivering a copy thereof to
him_ personally, or by leaving such copy at his
usual place of abode with so~e.person of s~itable
age and discretion there residing. [Emphasis added]
It is clear from the facts and record that Defendant
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was never personally served.

It is undisputed that a

friend of Appellant, a Ed Oberg was served with the papers
while he was at Appellant's residence.

Ed Oberg's sworn

Affidavit revealed that he was not living or residing at
Appellant's place of apode.

Quoting from Ed Oberg's Sup-

plemental Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
paragraph 3:
That Affiant was not a resident of 2445 East 450
North, Layton, Utah, nor living at said residence
at the time the Summons and Complaint was received
by him; that I informed the officer of this fact
at the time I was given said papers, but I was
instructed to take them anyway.
The law is as stated in 62 Am Jur 2d 887, and 14 L.Ed
2d 751 should be controlling on this issue.

62 Am Jur 2d

887, 888 states:
That the person with whom the papers are left must
live within the occupied premises of the Defendant.
Federal courts have uniformly held accordingly and have
ruled upon the exact question as is present in the instant
case.

Utah's statute is almost identical to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

14 L.Ed 2d 751 states that:

There is authority to the effect that where
a Defendant maintains a household, the words
"then residing therein" meal'l;, so far as the
"residing" aspect is concerned, that the
person with whom the papers are left must live
within the occupied premises, so that a servant
for example, who sleeps elsewhere would not be
a person "residing therein".
In Zucherman v. McCullay, 7 FRD 739 app. dismd. 1970 F 2d
1015, the Defendant in that case filed a motion to quash
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service of process in that a.Summons and Complaint had not
been left at Defendant's "dwelling house or .usual place
of abode with some person of a suitable age and discretion
then residing therein" in conformity with Rule 4 (d) (1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

At the hearing, evi-

dence was presented that showed the person served was an
employee of the Defendant's, a janitor, who worked there
during1the day, but who lived elsewhere.

The District Court

concluded that the person served was not "residing therein"
within the meaning of the Rule.

The United States Court

of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling.

See also:

Leo v. Shin Shu, 30 FRD 56 and Judson v. Judson, FRD 366;
Smith v. Kincaid, 249 F 2d 243,

{case distinguishedbecause

court felt a "nexus" existed where landlady was served}.

It

is clear from the cases cited that a person served must be
living or residing at Defendant's place of abode at the time
the person is served in order for jurisdiction to be obtained over Defendant.

Because our statute is nearly identical

to the one cited in Zucherman, supra., this court should
also require service on a person living or residing at Defendant's residence in order to have valid service of process.
This was not done in the instant case and, therefore, this
Court should rule in favor of the Appellant.
POINT 2:
STRICT COMPLIANCE OF THE STATUTE IS REQUIRED WHEN
SERVICE IS MADE IN A MANNER OTHER THAN BY PERSONAL SERVICE.
Utah courts have uniformly held that there must be
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strict compliance with the statute allowing service of process by means other than by serving the Defendant personally.
Redwood Land Company v. Kimball, 20 UT 2d 113, 433 P 2d 1010
(1967), Utah Sand and Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 UT
2d 407, 402 P 2d 703.

It may be pointed out that the legis-

lative intent which allows even a substituted form of service
of process was done with the belief that persons residing
with the person served would likely be family members of that
person.

In Bank of America National Trust and Savings

Association v. Carr, 292 P 2d 587, the Court held that even
though the service of process procedures were substantially
complied with, that "the statutory conditions on which service
depends must be strictly observed.

Unless the statute has

been complied with there is no power to render a judgment".
In the instant case, the said statute was not complied
with.

Our statute requires that substitute service, i.e.,

service other than by personal service, be made on a person
of a suitable age residing or living with the person on whom
service is desired, living at that person's usual place of
abode.

It is clear from the record that no one but the

Appellant lived or resided at 445 East 450 North, Layton, Utah.
Quoting from the transcript of the hearing on this matter at
page 17 line 24:
Q.

(By Mr. Eliason) What members of your family did

you have residing with you on November the 3rd, 1978,
at that address?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

There is no one that resided at that address

besides myself.
Q.

And who is Ed Obert? (sic)

A.

Ed Obert (sic) is a friend of mine.

Q.

And where did Ed Obert (sic)

live on the third

day of November, -1978?
A.

I assume.he lived in Roy.

The Court:

The 7th is the day.

And quoting further at line 19 page 18:
Q.

(By Mr. Eliason)

Did he. [Ed Oberg] report to

you about the Sheriff having served a Summons upon him?
A.

He did.

Skipping to line 26, supra.
Q.

What did he [Ed Oberg] tell you in that regards?

A.

He just told me that the Sheriff brought a

Summons and wanted him to give it to me.
There can be no question that the statute allowing substitute service was not complied with.

The issuance and ser-

vice of a Summons is a requirement of acquiring jurisdiction
over a Defendant.

Since the correctness of service is of

such prime essence to a lawsuit, the procedure by which
service of process is allowed must be strictly complied with.
POINT 3: ACTUAL NOTICE IS NO CURE FOR DEFECTIVE SERVICE OF
PROCESS WHERE THE STATUTE ALLOWING PROCESS HAS NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH.
Actual notice of a lawsuit does not remedy defective
service of process.

Opposing counsel will argue that Appel-
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lant received the Summons and Complaint.
ted.

This fact is admit-

However, receiving the papers by any other means than

is allowed by statute still would not correct a defective
service.

The hearing record is clear how Appellant received

notice regarding the lawsuit.

Quoting from the transcript

page 3 line 10:
The Court:

What you are saying is that service was

effective upon one Ed Obert (sic)?
Mr. Holt:

That is correct, your honor.

Skipping line 16; supra:
The Court:

And that Ed Obert (sic), pursuant to his

Affidavit, left those pleadings, Summons and Complaint
with or in the screen door?
Mr. Holt:

That is correct.

Continuing to line 17 page 8:
Q.

Would you tell the Court and inform the Court

when you first knew or gained knowledge regarding a
lawsuit had been commenced against you and the circumstances surrounding that?
Continuing to line 28, supra:
A.

(Appellant)

I am not sure of the date; I'm sure it

was that part of the year.
/

The Court:
The Witness:

All right, next question.
I arrived home late at night, sometime

probably after 9:00 and I find an envelope that is stuck
in the back door, and I, of course, opened it and
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looked inside and it was the Summons ...
In Utah Sand and ·Gravel Products Corp., at 705, supra,
the court held that there is no :. other substitute for following the procedures required for service of process.
The requisite formalities of the Summons and the
manner of service prescribed by law are intended
to assume the recipient the bona fides of the Court
process and the importance of his giving serious
attention thereto.
These cannot be supplanted
by the mere notice by .letter, telephone or any
other such means.
Clearly, finding papers stuck in a screen door late at
night would not constitute service of process.

Although

Appellant received the papers, the manner in which he received them would leave much to be desired.

Actual notice

is no cure for a defective service of process, and even
though he received the papers, no jurisdiction was obtained
over him and he was under no duty to respond, because the
service of process was defective.

Defective service of pro-

cess is not currible by any means except re-servicing him.
It would appear then, that since no jurisdiction was obtained
over the Appellant, that the lower court would have no
authority to enter a default judgment and Appellant's appeal
should be granted.
POINT 4:
THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTS TO THE PLAINTIFF ONCE
THE DEFENDANT HAS ESTABLISHED THE SERVICE OF PROCESS TO BE
DEFECTiIVE.
It is logical to believe that once the issue of defective service of process has been raised and there is sufficient evidence to rebut the correctness of the Affidavit of
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Return of Service, the burden is upon the Plaintiff to
establish that the facts as are set forth in said Affidavit
are correct.
The only evidence before the district court presented
by the Respondent was the Affidavit of the Return of Service
wherein the process server stated that he left the papers
with "a person of suitable age and discretion and residing
at the usual place of abode of the said Defendant."

Appellant

testified that no one lived with him; that he dwelt alone
with no family, etc.

Ed Oberg, on his oath, stated that he

told the officer that he did not live at Appellant's residence,
but was instructed to take: the papers anyway.

There was no

evidence presented, other than what the pre-printed standard
Affidavit of Return of Service set forth.
Appellant met his burden to rebute the validity of the
return and the burden then shifted to Respondent to establish
the validity of the return.

No evidence was presented to

substantiate that the person served was "residing at Appellant's place of abode."

Appellant believes that Respondent

failed to meet his burden in that Respondent failed to
verify the correctness of the Return of Service and that the
lower Court erred in not granting Appellant's Motion to Set
Aside the Default Judgment.
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ISSUE II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO VACATE A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHERE THE
APPELLANT DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE WAS A REASONABLE
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE FOR HIS FAILURE TO FILE AN
ANSWER.

POINT l: APPELLANT WAS MISLEAD INTO· NOT FILING AN ANSWER
TO RESPONDENT'S COMPLAINT BY STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY.
Appellant was mislead as to what actions he should
take to protect his legal interest in the instant case by
certain statements and representations made to him by
Respondent's attorney.

Utah law provides a remedy from a

default judgment where the defaulting party was mislead as
to what actions he should take to protect himself.
60

Rule

(b) (1) states:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
Court may in the interest of justice, relieve a
party ... from a final judgment ... for the following
reasons:
(1)
mistake, inadvertance ... or
excusable neglect.

Ample authority exists that this mislead party is entitled
to relief under the said rule.

Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 301

P 2d 426, a California Appeal case stated that there is
excusable neglect where there are settlement negotiations
and where there is an oral or implied understanding that no
default will be taken without notice.
There can be no doubt that a trial court may find
excusable neglect or surprise where settlement
negotiations are being had between counsel, ~nd
where
there
isLibrary.
anFunding
oral
or implied
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that no default will be taken without notice
and counsel takes such a default without notice.
Yarbrough, supra at p.430 (see also Wayburn v. Anderson, 253
P. 149'; Greenamyer v. Bd. of Lugo E. S. Dist., 2 P 2d 848;
Beard v. Beard, 107 P 2d 385; Bonfilio v. Granger, 140
P 2d 861; Greenwell v. Caro 249, P 2d 573 for additional
authority).

It would therefore seem logical to assume where

the understanding is made between the opposing counsel and
a Defendant, that even greater latitude would be allowed
for the lay person to be excused by his inadvertance in
defending himself.

The evidence produced at the hearing to

set aside the default judgment clearly demonstrated that
Appellant was mislead into not filing an Answer to Respondent's
Complaint because he was to obtain weigh tickets and then a
settlement.would be reached.
Appellant, in his Affidavit and his testimony reasonably
demonstrated that Respondent's attorney agreed to forego
further legal action until Appellant could obtain weight tickets which were in the possession of a third party.

The

tickets which were in the possession of a third party.

The

hearing transcript establishes Appellant's understanding
of what he had agreed to do.

Quoting from line 13 page 9:

[After Appellant found the papers in his screen door]

Q.

What action did you take on your part?

A.

Either the following day or the day after, I don't

recall whether I had trouble getting ahold of the
attorney or not, but I made a call to Mr. Roberts'
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surprised, and that I thought it wasn't a founded
matter; there was no basis for it, and we talked at
length about cattle; he indicating to me that he,

..

himself, raised cattle and thought that the issues
weren't exactly strong and the gain on the cattle
wasn't exactly what you would expect it to be.
Q.

Who did you talk to?

A.

Mr. Eliason.

Q.

Did he identify himself to you on the phone as

being Mr. Eliason?
A.

He did.

Contiriuing to line 2 page 10:
A . . . . Well, it come down to the issue of what the
cattle weighed when they were received at Delta.

_
Well,

I had instructed the truckers that trucked the cattle
from Skoal Valley to weigh the cattle at Delta.
Going to line 18 page 10:
Q.

Did he indicate to you at any time that he would

forego taking a default judgment?
A.

Our conversation was that I would get ahold of the

trucker, get the weigh tickets, which apparently were
not picked up by Mr. Roberts and taken by the truckers;
the discussion was I would get the weigh tickets and
get together with Mr. Roberts and his attorney and try
to get this thing worked out.
Q.

Did at any time Mr. Eliason give you a date to
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which this needed to be accomplished?
A.

No date was set.

Q.

So with your conversation, what was your understarid-

ing, then, as to what Mr. Eliason-[An objection was raised at this question which was
overruled.]

Continuing to line 9 page 11:

The Court:

I think it is a conclusion he can properly

draw and testify to.
The Witness:

Answer the question.

My understanding was, I was to get ahold

of the trucking company, obtain the weight tickets and
set up a meeting with Mr. Eliason and Mr. Roberts to
resolve the issue.
Q.

At any time did he advise you that you needed to

obtain counsel or file an Answer to the Complaint?
A.

At no time.

Going to line 12 page 13:
Q.

Then you proceeded on the assumption that nothing

further would be done on it [further legal action] with
regards to the lawsuit until these weigh tickets could
be obtained by you and that you and Plaintiff's attorney
would meet together and resolve the issue?
A.

Correct.

Respondent's attorney verified on direct examination,
that the conversation took place and testified to substantially the same outline of the conversation.

(see lines 9

through 18 at page 23, lines 3 through 24 at page 24 of the
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transcript).

Respondent's attorney admitted that the weight

tickets were essential to the case and that the weight
tickets "would be a fundamental question involved." line 10
page 24.
Respondent's attorney also stated and advised the
Appellant to pursue the obtaining of the weigh tickets in
order that the parties could reach a settlement in the instant case.

Respondent's attorney admitted that Appellant

should pursue the possibility of settlement, quoting from
line 12 page 25:

Q.

Did you ever tell him [Appellant] or infer to

him that you and your client, Mr. Roberts, and he
should have a meeting to see if this issue [the weigh
tickets and difference in gains] could be resolved
after he obtained the weight tickets?
A.

(Respondent's attorney)

of a conversation.

I don't remember that kind

I definitely told him that if

there was any area of settlement of this case that we
should follow it.

But I advised him, I am sure, that

he should get legal counsel.
Q.

But then you did discuss there an area of settle-

ment that it should be followed with him, then, is
that correct?
A.

Oh, I suppose that I might have said, "If there's

any possibility of settlement that you should follow it."
Although Respondent's attorney could not remember ex-
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actly what was said, the record reveals sufficient evidence
to establish that a reasonable man discussing a case with the
opposing attorney could reasonably infer from that conversation that nothing further would be done until the weigh
tickets could be obtained.

Furthermore, Respondent had

been advised to pursue the "possibilities of settlement", and
that after the weigh tickets were obtained, "we'll meet" and
resolve the issue.

It is undisputed that the conversation

took place after Appellant found the Summons and Complaint.
A reasonable man could reasonably inf er that no further action
would be taken.

The district court erred in not vacating

the default judgment since reasonable justification existed
to show that Appellant was mislead and as to what he should
do.
POINT 2:
IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO VACATE
A DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHERE REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION EXISTS.
It has long been held that it is an abuse of the discretion of a court to refuse to vacate a default judgment where
a reasonable justification exists as to why the Defendant failed to file a response to an action.

Mayhem v. Standard

Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 P 2d 951; Byland v. Crook,
6 0 Utah 2 8 5 , 2 8 8 , 2 O8 P 5 O4 , 5 O5 ( 19 2 2 ) .

Ru 1 e 6 0 ( b ) ( 1 ) s ta te

in part that:
The court may in the furtherance of justice relieve
a party of his legal representative from a final
judgment, order or proceedings for the following
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reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or
excusable neglect.
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Company, 123 Utah 415, 260 P
2d 741, the court stated at page 743 that where an oral
promise is made to forego taking a default and the time for
answering is extended that
Relief in such instances is granted not because the
other party was fraudulent but because Complainant
[the Defendant] was deprived of his chance to
present his case by the conduct of the party
whether or not the conduct was consciously wrongful.
In

~he

instant case, the Defendant herein complains

to the Court that representations were orally made to him by
the ·Respondent's attorney that no further legal action would
take place until he obtained certain weigh slips and that
the parties hereto could meet and settle the matter without
the need of the lawsuit.
Applying the rule set forth in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
supra, this Court should have found that Respondent's attorney's
conduct could have reasonably mislead the Appellant into a
false sense of security regarding what action would be necessary to take on his part in order to
rights in this case.

prese~ve

his legal

The testimony of both the Appellant and

Respondent's attorney of the conversation that took place
between them, leaves a little doubt as to what was agreed on
and that the Appellant could have reasonably been mislead
as to what he should have done.

Respondent's attorney testi-

fied that he could have discussed the possibility of settlement
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and it was possible.

Under the circumstances and purview

of the topics discussed, that the Appellant was lead into
a mistaken belief that he would not have to file an Answer
until the weigh slips were obtained.
Respondent's attorney's forebearance to file a default
judgment,

(which he could have filed approximately four and

one-half months earlier), would tend to support Appellant's
contention that an agreement between them existedo

Respon-

dent's attorney, on direct examination testified to the fact
that Appellant was not instructed to file an answer within
20 days, contrary to other testimony.

Quoting from line 19

page 26 from the transcript:
Q.

I said, in your conversation you did not tell

him at any time that you expected him to have the
answer filed within 20 days as per the summons?.
A.

I don't think :that specific statement was made •...

Furthermore, on direct examinati6n, Respondent's attorney
admitted that he felt Appellant had become "dilatory".

Why

would an adverse party believe someone was "dilatory" if
there was not some understanding that that party was to perform something?

Respondent's attorney acknowledged

the~eby

that he had indeed been waiting for Respondent to obtain the
weigh tickets.

Quoting from line 11 page 27, Respondent's

attorney makes this acknowledgement:
Q.
4~

(Appellant's attorney)

Is one reason why [waiting

months before taking default] is because you were

waiting for him [Appellant] to obtain the weigh tickets,
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so that you could settle this matter, or the reason
that you proceeded was because your client pressured
you to take default?
A.

I had been waiting quite some time before and

felt that he [Appellant] had become dilatory and
felt that the only answer was to file a default and
default judgment.
Q.

Did you ever attempt to contact him either by

writing or by oral communication to tell him that he
had better respond or you were going to take default?
A.

No.

I had no obligation to ....

Certainly from the record, it is clear that there was
an understanding between Appellant and Respondent's attorney,
that no further action would be taken until the weigh slips
were obtained.

It is clear Appellant exercised good faith

and attempted to obtain the weigh slips.

(see Appellant's

testimony lines 27 page 11 through line 17 page 13 of transcript)

It is undisputed that Appellant was selling his pro-

perty in Utah and moving to Idaho during the interval prior
to the entry of the default.
effort.

Appellant exercised his best

Where such evidence was before the Court, the Court

erred in not granting Appellant's motion.

The facts and

evidence presented show that a reasonable justification existed for the Appellant not to act and his actions came clearly within the meaning of Rule 60 (b) (1) and as such, the
lower court abused its discretion in not setting aside the
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default ..
POINT 3: APPELLANT'S MOTION UNDER RULE 60
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WAS TIMELY .MADE ..

(b) (1), UTAH RULES

The trial court made no findings or conclusions in this
matter to the contrary that Appellant's motion was not timely
made.

It is clear from the record, that Appellant filed his

motion around three months from the date the judgme.nt was
entered and clearly within three months from the date Appellant received notice that a default judgment had been filed.
(See transcript line 18 page 20 through line 12 at page 21)
CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in not granting Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside a Default Judgment on two grounds.

The

first ground is that the Court never obtained jurisdiction
over the Appellant because a person was served who did not
"reside at Appellant's place of abode" as required by statute.
Lack of jurisdiction is a question that can be attacked at
any time.

There is overwhelming evidence which established

that the person served was not living or residing with the
Appellant at the time of service.

Respondent failed to

produce any evidence to the contrary.

For these reasons,

Appellant's appeal should be granted and the default judgment should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction.
Secondly, this case deals with the very elements and
reasons why Rule 60

(b) (1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was

established, namely, to allow a person to respond where there
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has been a "mistake, inadvertance or excusable neglect."
The ·facts establish

beyond~doubt

that Appellant believed

and understood that Respondent's attorney had agreed to
forego further legal action until weigh tickets, which were
"fundamental'' to the issue of the lawsuit, could be obtained.
That Appellant exercised "due diligence" in obtaining them;
that Appellant was never instructed to perform by a certain date or contacted subsequent by Respondent's attorney
to give him notice of Respondent's attorney's intent to
file a default because Appellant had been "dilatory".

If

this Court finds that there was jurisdiction over the
Appellant by the lower court, then irregardless, Appellant
is entitled to have the default judgment vacated and the
issues between the parties heard on their merits, because of
the equitable doctrine of excusible neglect.
Therefore, Appellant respectfully requests that his
Appeal be granted and the default judgment entered against
him in the lower court be vacated.
DATED this 27th day of March, 1980.

SC~t~

Appellant, Douglas K. Freeland
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